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I. INTRODUCTION
In 207 B.C.E., the peasant rebel Liu Bang led an attack on the capital city of
Xianyang. 1 As the Qin Dynasty had been in tumult since the death of its first
emperor three years earlier, the weakened King Ziying had little choice but to
surrender. 2 Liu Bang, who would soon ascend to the throne as the first emperor
of the Han Dynasty, announced that he would abolish the harsh and complex Qin
penal code and seek a simpler alternative. 3 According to legend, Liu repealed the
Qin code and in its place promulgated only three articles of law: “First, murderers
will be put to death; second, those who hurt others will be penalized; third, those
who steal or rob will be punished.” 4 Since then, the expression “agreeing on
three articles of law” 5 has become an idiom referring to the laying down of simple
and clear rules. 6
Unfortunately, modern copyright law does not lend itself to simplicity or
clarity. While China has made significant legal advancements in recent decades,
expanding, modernizing, and bringing coherency to its intellectual property (“IP”)
laws, sizeable gray areas remain in the area of copyright. One such ambiguity
pertains to the “fundamental principle . . . that a copyright does not protect an
idea, but only the expression of the idea.” 7 This doctrine, referred to as the
“idea/expression dichotomy,” is not currently enshrined in the Copyright Law,
China’s general copyright statute. 8 The failure to codify such a basic doctrine
would potentially be problematic in any modern copyright system, but it is
particularly so in the context of China’s civil law system, which does not
officially countenance doctrinal development through judicial precedent.9

1

Burton Watson, The Rise of Liu Bang, Founder of the Han, in 1 SOURCES OF CHINESE
TRADITION 232, 232 (William Theodore de Bary & Irene Bloom eds., 2d ed. 2000).
2
JOHN W. HEAD & YANPING WANG, LAW CODES IN DYNASTIC CHINA: A SYNOPSIS OF
CHINESE LEGAL HISTORY IN THE THIRTY CENTURIES FROM ZHOU TO QING 76 (2005).
3
Watson, supra note 1, at 233; LIU YONGPING, ORIGINS OF CHINESE LAW: PENAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN ITS EARLY DEVELOPMENT 263–64 (1998).
4
SITU TAN, BEST CHINESE IDIOMS: VOLUME 2 158 (Tang Bowen trans., 10th ed. 1999).
约法三章 (yue fa san zhang). Id..
Id.
7
Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 703 (2d Cir. 1992).
8
Xiao Jun, Zhu zuo quan fa zhong sixiang yu biao da liang fen fa yuan ze han yi [The
Meaning of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law], 21 JIANGSU JING GUAN XUE YUAN
XUE BAO [J. JIANGSU POLICE OFFICER C.], No. 3, at 73, 73 (2006); Copyright Law (promulgated
by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Congress, Sept. 7, 2001, effective June 1, 1991,
amended Oct. 27, 2001), translated at http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/laws/laws/copyright/
232720.shtml (P.R.C.) [hereinafter P.R.C. Copyright Law].
9
DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN A
NUTSHELL 211–12 (2003). The Chinese judicial system is remarkably different from Western
5
6
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The implications of this deficiency extend beyond the narrow realm of private
copyright disputes, for the scope of copyright bears upon the contours of the
public domain and the sphere of permissible speech. Recognition of copyright in
ideas would shrink the public domain, restricting others’ ability to respond to,
retransmit, build upon, or otherwise make use of those ideas. On the other hand,
an excessively rigid or narrow view of copyrightable expression may likewise
discourage speech by reducing incentives to produce and disseminate original
works. 10 For these reasons, recognition (and, impliedly, the appropriate
calibration) of the idea/expression dichotomy is a “constitutional requirement” in
U.S. law. 11 Given China’s lack of genuine speech protection, 12 these concerns
become even more pressing in the Chinese context.
This Article argues that, lack of codification notwithstanding, the
idea/expression dichotomy has gained widespread recognition among Chinese
jurists. Over the past few decades, the doctrine has encountered cultural and
linguistic obstacles, and has been the subject of significant conceptual
disagreement among scholars and lawmakers. Far from clarifying the doctrine,
China’s statutory regime has only further obscured the distinction between ideas
models, especially those found in common-law countries. China’s judicial system is comprised of
the people’s courts, which adjudicate cases; the people’s procuratorates, which prosecute cases;
and public security organs, which investigate illegal activity. Id. at 194. Although the
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China provides that the people’s courts shall “exercise
judicial power independently,” XIAN FA art. 26, § 1 (1982) (P.R.C.), this independence is subject
to both formal and informal restraints. The National People’s Congress sits at the top of the
hierarchy of governmental organs; the Supreme People’s Court is responsible to the National
People’s Congress and its Standing Committee, and the people’s courts are subordinate to the
people’s congresses at each level of government. CHOW, supra, at 195. Additionally, the
president of the Supreme People’s Court ranks lower than the premier of the State Council (the
highest organ of state administration), reflecting the courts’ inferior position relative to the State
Council. Id. at 195–96. The courts at each level are also subject to Chinese Communist Party
influence. Id. at 198–99. For a concise and superb overview of the Chinese judicial system,
please see id. at 192–224.
10
Cf. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“[I]t should
not be forgotten that the Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By
establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic
incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”).
11
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
12
Although the Chinese Constitution bestows a right to free speech, XIAN FA art. 35, § 1
(1982) (P.R.C.), there is currently no mechanism for private enforcement of that right. See CHOW,
supra note 9, at 111 (2003):
While China recognizes a number of human rights in theory in the Constitution,
these rights are not recognized in practice because of an absence of
implementing legislation. . . .
[Because] the Constitution is not selfimplementing and in the absence of legislation, PRC citizens find that they have
no way to exercise their constitutional rights.
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and protected expression. Yet, as this Article demonstrates, modern Chinese
courts not only recognize the idea/expression dichotomy, but have managed to
apply it in a reasonably coherent and defensible manner. Considerable problems
and inconsistencies certainly persist, but the judiciary’s relative success in
“agreeing on three articles law” where the legislature has failed to do so suggests
that Chinese courts, although formally limited in their authority to pronounce
doctrine, nevertheless serve an essential lawmaking function.
Despite the foundational character of the idea/expression dichotomy, very
little has been written in the English language about the doctrine under Chinese
law. This Article attempts to fill this gap by exploring Chinese legal scholarship
on the idea/expression dichotomy and by analyzing the doctrine’s exposition and
application in Chinese courts. The Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides a
point of reference by describing the idea/expression dichotomy under U.S. law,
and then summarizes the history of copyright in China. Part III discusses the
development of the idea/expression dichotomy in Chinese law, highlighting the
conceptual and statutory difficulties that the doctrine has encountered. Part IV
then provides a survey of the doctrine’s understanding and application “on the
ground” in China by reference to a sampling of judicial opinions, with attention to
both the successes and problem areas that these cases reveal. Part V concludes
with an analysis of the Article’s findings and a brief discussion of the broader
questions these findings raise regarding the Chinese judicial system.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Idea/Expression Dichotomy
The term “idea/expression dichotomy” refers to the principle that copyright
protection extends only to “those aspects of [a] work — termed ‘expression’ —
that display the stamp of the author’s originality.” 13 Pursuant to this doctrine,
which has been described as the “most fundamental axiom of copyright law,” 14
the author of a work may not prevent others from appropriating the facts, ideas,
concepts, and other non-expressive elements contained in his work, so long his
original expression is left untouched. 15 The dichotomy therefore furthers the
public-oriented objectives of copyright law 16 by guaranteeing that authors and
artists have sufficient commercial incentives to produce and disseminate creative
13

Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547.
Feist, 499 U.S. at 353.
15
See id. at 349–50 (“[c]opyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but
encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.” (citing
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556–57)).
16
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (purpose of intellectual property to “promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts”).
14
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works, 17 while safeguarding the public’s right to “build freely upon the ideas and
information conveyed” in those works. 18 As the primary demarcation between
private rights and the public domain, the idea/expression dichotomy also serves to
mediate the inherent tension between copyright and free speech. 19
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Baker v. Selden 20 provides one of the earliest
articulations of the doctrine in American law. 21 There, the plaintiff sued to
enforce a copyright in a book that explained a particular system of bookkeeping. 22 The defendant had produced books that described “substantially the
same system,” but employed a different “form of arrangement.” 23 The disposition
of the case hinged on whether the plaintiff “had the exclusive right to the use of
the system explained in his book,” or whether “the system [was] open to public
use.” 24 The Court stated that recognition of a copyright in the book-keeping
system would effect a “surprise and a fraud upon the public,” for while the
“description of the art” was entitled to copyright, the “art” itself was not. 25
Because the defendant did not copy the plaintiff’s original expression, the Court
held that he had not infringed the plaintiff’s copyright. 26

17

See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(“[Copyright] is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the
provision of a special reward . . . .”).
18
Feist, 499 U.S. at 350.
19
See Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free
Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1192 (1970) (concluding that the idea/expression
dichotomy generally “represents an acceptable definitional balance as between copyright and free
speech interests”); see also Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562
F.2d 1157, 1170 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[T]he idea-expression dichotomy . . . serves to accommodate
the competing interests of copyright and the first amendment.”).
20
101 U.S. 99 (1879).
21
See Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and
Copyright in a Work’s ‘Total Concept and Feel’, 38 EMORY L.J. 393, 400 (1989) (“The seminal
case of Baker v. Selden was one of the first to employ the idea/expression dichotomy to deny a
claim of copyright.”). But see Jerome H. Reichman, Computer Programs as Applied Scientific
Know-How: Implications of Copyright Protection for Commercialized University Research, 42
VAND. L. REV. 639, 693 n.288 (1989) (arguing that if Baker v. Selden simply stood for the
idea/expression dichotomy, it “would have been superfluous at the time it was handed down,
because the idea-expression doctrine dates back to the earliest origins of both domestic and foreign
copyright law, and it was readily available to the Court if that was the point it had wanted to
make.”).
22
Baker, 101 U.S. at 99–100.
23
Id. at 100–101.
24
Id. at 100.
25
Id. at 102, 105 (emphasis added).
26
Id. at 107.
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The most significant modern exposition of the doctrine came in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service, Co. 27 In considering the
copyrightability of a telephone directory,28 the Supreme Court clarified that
copyright did not inhere in the “sweat of [an author’s] brow,” but rather in his
original expression. 29 Thus, even though Rural Telephone had devoted a
substantial amount of time, effort, and money to compiling the information in its
directory, it was not entitled to an exclusive right in that information; under the
idea/expression dichotomy, “a subsequent compiler remain[ed] free to use [those]
facts” without Rural’s permission. 30 The Court further held that in order to
qualify as original expression, a work must exhibit at least a “modicum of
creativity.” 31 Because the expressive elements of Rural’s directory — its
selection, coordination, and arrangement of facts 32 — did not even satisfy this
low threshold, they did not constitute “expression” for the purposes of copyright,
and could therefore be freely copied. 33
The idea/expression dichotomy is codified in Section 102(b) of the U.S.
Copyright Act, which provides that copyright shall not “extend to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery.” 34 The doctrine has also been recognized, using similar language, in a
number of international copyright treaties. Both the World Intellectual Property
Organization Copyright Treaty (“WIPO Copyright Treaty”) and Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs Agreement”), for
instance, state that “[c]opyright protection extends to expressions and not to ideas,
procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such.” 35

27

Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 342 (1991).
Id. at 344.
29
See id. at 359–60 (“[O]riginality, not ‘sweat of the brow,’ is the touchstone of copyright
protection . . . .”).
30
Id. at 349.
31
Id. at 346.
32
See id. at 356–57 (selection, coordination and arrangement of a factual compilation may be
copyrighted).
33
See id. at 362.
34
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
35
World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. 2, Dec. 20, 1996, 112 Stat.
2860, 36 I.L.M. 65; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Law art. 9.2,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1201
(1994).
28
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B. Copyright Law in China
Although the term “copyright” did not appear in China until the early
twentieth century, 36 some have argued that the advent of Chinese printing
technology — which preceded the Gutenberg press by several hundred years 37 —
gave rise to a primitive copyright system. 38 The Tang Dynasty introduced what
may be “the oldest publication ordinance in history” in the ninth century, 39 and
beginning with the Song Dynasty in the tenth century, China’s Imperial Court
exercised exclusive control over the printing of the Confucian Classics and certain
other publications, producing official versions of the texts while forbidding
private printers from reprinting unauthorized copies. 40 Scholars have also
identified instances in which private publishers attached notices to works
Historical records indicate that,
prohibiting their illicit reproduction. 41
occasionally, local officials enforced these notices by destroying infringing
typefaces and punishing the offending parties. 42 Some scholars, including
Chinese copyright expert Zheng Chengsi, interpret these practices as evidence of
an imperial copyright system. 43
This history certainly reveals a tradition of printing regulation in China, but
whether it can rightly be termed a “copyright” regime is less certain. As Zheng
himself concedes, a formal copyright law “has never been discovered,” 44 despite
China’s rich legal history. 45 William P. Alford argues that Imperial China’s
36

See ZHENG CHENGSI & MICHAEL PENDLETON, COPYRIGHT LAW IN CHINA 16 (1991).
The earliest existing examples of Chinese wood block printing date to the eighth century.
See id. at 11. Movable type printing also emerged in China at least 150 years before it did in the
West (and possibly much earlier than that). See id. at 14–15.
38
See id. at 11–12.
39
See CHAN HOK-LAM, CONTROL OF PUBLISHING IN CHINA, PAST AND PRESENT 2 (1983)
(decree issued in December 835 forbade “the private printing of almanacs by the local
administrations”).
40
See ZHENG CHENGSI & PENDLETON, supra note 36, at 12. Song publication laws “were
aimed at protecting the state’s exclusive privileges in the compilation and dissemination of certain
categories of works and literature.” CHAN HOK-LAM, supra note 39, at 4. The Imperial Court did
apparently provide for a type of licensing system, under which private printers could reproduce
some official works with authorization and for a fee. See id. at 19.
41
ZHENG CHENGSI & PENDLETON, supra note 36, at 16.
42
ZHENG CHENGSI, CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER LAW 86
(1987).
43
See id. at 86–87.
44
ZHENG CHENGSI & PENDLETON, supra note 36, at 16.
45
Imperial China (especially the later dynasties) had an extensive written code, covering both
criminal and civil matters. See generally WRITING AND LAW IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA (Robert E.
Hegel & Katherine Carlit eds., 2007); THE GREAT MING CODE/DA MING LÜ (Jiang Yonglin trans.,
Univ. of Wash. Press 2005); THE GREAT QING CODE (William C. Jones trans., Clarendon Press
1994).
37
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extensive control over printed materials reflects concern over “the proliferation of
undesirable printed materials” rather than recognition of private rights in literary
property. 46 Printing regulation allowed the government “to define and supervise
the realm of acceptable ideas,” a paternal responsibility that Confucian
philosophy vested in the emperor. 47 The assertion that commercial printers may
have affixed notices discouraging the reprinting of certain works, and that local
officials may have occasionally been prevailed upon to punish piracy, is not
conclusive evidence of an indigenous Chinese copyright system. 48 As Cynthia J.
Brokaw writes, late Imperial China saw “only very tentative development of ideas
of copyright,” 49 and “these concerns were never incorporated into the legal
code.” 50
Regardless of whether Imperial China’s control over the printing industry may
be considered a primitive copyright system, the notion of “copyright” in the
Western sense did not officially enter the Chinese lexicon until the signing of a
1903 Sino-American treaty. 51 While the treaty was rather thin in substance, 52 in
46

See WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 13–15 (1995); see also CHAN HOK-LAM, supra note 39,
at 2–3 (“[T]he Sung dynasty . . . promulgated elaborate laws and regulations governing the
publication and distribution of literary works to uphold their prerogatives, purge unorthodox ideas
and expressions, and stem the leak of information on state affairs and military defence to the
northern enemy states.”).
47
See ALFORD, supra note 46, at 24. Alford quotes Thomas Metzger as follows: “Lacking . . .
John Stuart Mill’s optimistic view that good doctrines would emerge victorious out of a free
marketplace of ideas, Chinese political philosophers since Mencius and Xunzi have instead
emphasized the human tendency to become deluded through the interplay of ‘false’ and ‘correct’
doctrine.” Id. at 23 (THOMAS A. METZGER, Foreword to RICHARD W. WILSON ET AL., MORAL
BEHAVIOR IN CHINESE SOCIETY xiv (1981)).
48
See ALFORD, supra note 46, at 14:
There is some evidence of printers of the innocuous seeking the
assistance of local officials to combat unauthorized use of their works
and even of signs being posted to that effect—but these efforts appear
scattered, ad hoc, and may well have been attributable to the fact that
. . . private printers and local officials were often one and the same.
CHAN HOK-LAM, supra note 39, at 21–22 (efforts to protect rights of authors or publishers
appear to be “only isolated cases of influential scholar-officials seeking to protect their own
interests;” such instances “undercut by the lack of a sound legal framework and of formal
procedures”).
49
See Cynthia J. Brokaw, On the History of the Book in China, in PRINTING AND BOOK
CULTURE IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 3, 7, 19 (Cynthia J. Brokaw & Kai-wing Chow eds., 2005).
50
See id. at 19.
51
ZHENG CHENGSI & PENDLETON, supra note 36, at 16.
52
See NORWOOD F. ALLMAN, PROTECTION OF TRADE-MARKS, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS AND
TRADE-NAMES IN CHINA 103–12 (1924) (describing provisions of 1903 treaty). Notably, the
treaty only applied to American works “especially prepared for the use and education of the
Chinese people” and “translation[s] into Chinese of any book.” Id. at 103–04. The term lasted for
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1910 (the final year of China’s long imperial history), the Qing government
managed to pass a true copyright statute 53 “contain[ing] substantive clauses
similar to those to be found in the copyright laws of other countries.” 54 The 1910
statute remained in effect for only one year, but served as a model for subsequent
copyright laws, which were promulgated in 1915 and again in 1928. 55
Nonetheless, due at least in part to the virtually constant conflict that plagued
China during the first half of the twentieth century, none of these statutes were
ever widely applied. 56
Although some preliminary copyright regulations were apparently drafted in
the early years of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”), 57 it would be decades
before another copyright statute was actually promulgated. 58 The PRC finally
instituted copyright in the 1980s by means of the Trial Regulations on Copyright
a mere 10 years from the date of registration, and Chinese citizens had the right to make, print, and
sell translations of American works without the permission of the author. Id.
53
ZHENG CHENGSI & PENDLETON, supra note 36, at 16. A Chinese version of the 1910
statute is available at Da Qing zhu zuo quan lü [Copyright Act of the Great Qing Dynasty],
http://zh.wikisource.org/zh-hans/大清著作權律 (last visited Dec. 15, 2009). An English
translation appears in ALLMAN, supra note 52, at 112–21. Although Allman indicates that the act
was promulgated in 1912, one year after the Republic of China was established, id. at 121, I have
found no evidence that any copyright law was promulgated in 1912, and have independently
confirmed that the Allman translation in fact conforms to the 1910 law.
54
ZHENG CHENGSI, supra note 42, at 87. The 1910 law applied to “literary works”; included
a registration requirement; granted rights of reproduction, alteration, and attribution; bestowed a
term of life plus thirty years; and enumerated several limitations, including a limited fair use
clause. See ALLMAN, supra note 52, at 112–13, 117–18. However, the statute provided very little
protection to foreign works. See ALFORD, supra note 46, at 42.
55
ZHENG CHENGSI, supra note 42, at 87. The 1928 law, issued by the Nationalist
government, provided substantial moral and economic rights protection to Chinese authors, but
like the 1903 treaty and subsequent statutes, granted only thin protection to foreigners. See
ALFORD, supra note 46, at 50 (describing provisions of 1928 statute).
56
See ALFORD, supra note 46, at 53 (“Clearly, the disruption occasioned by the invasion of
Manchuria in 1931, Chiang Kai-shek’s ongoing campaign to eradicate the Communists, further
Japanese aggression, and the Chinese civil war that followed greatly impaired efforts to infuse life
into the laws on intellectual property promulgated during the Nationalists’ first two decades.”).
57
The PRC was established on October 1, 1949. Various documents concerning copyright
were drafted in 1950s, including one entitled “Interim Regulations Concerning the Protection of
Copyright in Published Works.” ZHENG CHENGSI, supra note 42, at 90. These documents were
never implemented, however; Zheng suggests that this failure owes, at least in part, to the “series
of political movements” beginning with the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s and culminating
in the Cultural Revolution. See id.
58
During the early years of the PRC, authors’ rights were primarily governed by a set of
standard contracts that regulated author–publisher relations. See id. at 88–90. This system dealt
more with remuneration than copyright, and ultimately “succumbed when its pedestal, the
individual person’s author status, was dismantled by the Cultural Revolution.” See PETER FENG,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 65 (2d ed. 2003).
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Protection of Books and Periodicals (“Trial Regulations”), a classified document
that guided judges in early cases. 59 China did not publicly recognize copyright
until 1986, and even then said little more beyond providing that authors would
receive protection in their works.60 It was not until 1990 that the PRC
promulgated a formal copyright statute — the first in six decades. 61
While the 1990 Copyright Law substantially modernized China’s copyright
system, its protections were “appreciably more curtailed . . . than suggested by its
rhetoric and much of the initial commentary.” 62 Since promulgating the
Copyright Law, however, China’s governing and regulatory bodies have
continually supplemented and clarified it through regulations, guidelines, and
interpretations. 63 In 2001, the National People’s Congress amended the
intellectual property laws in preparation for China’s accession into the World
Trade Organization. 64 Additionally, in the last two decades China has signed on
to the major international copyright agreements, including the Berne Convention,
TRIPs Agreement, and WIPO Copyright Treaty. 65
The Copyright Law does not currently incorporate the idea/expression
dichotomy. 66 To date, the doctrine has only been codified in the Computer
Software Protection Regulations (“Software Regulations”), which were first
issued in 1991 to address the special nature of software copyrights. 67

59

See FENG, supra note 58, at 65–66.
See ALFORD, supra note 46, at 77 (describing Article 94 of the General Principles of the
Civil Law, the “PRC’s first major public recognition of copyright”); cf. General Principles of the
Civil Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., April 12, 1986,
effective Jan. 1, 1987), art. 94, translated at http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=2696
(recognizing copyright) (P.R.C.).
61
FENG, supra note 58, at 66.
62
ALFORD, supra note 46, at 78.
63
XUE HONG & ZHENG CHENGSI, CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE 21ST
CENTURY (2002) xxxv–xxxvii.
64
Id. at xxxix.
65
See id. at xxxix, 5 (describing China’s accession to Berne Convention, TRIPs Agreement);
World Intellectual Property Organization, WCT Notification No. 66: Accession, Mar. 9, 2007,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/html.jsp?file=/redocs/notdocs/en/wct/treaty_wct_66.html (last
visited Dec. 2, 2009) (announcing China’s accession to WIPO Copyright Treaty) (P.R.C.).
66
See generally PRC Copyright Law.
67
Regulations on Computer Software Regulation (promulgated by the State Council, June 4,
1991, effective Oct. 1, 1991) art. 7, translated at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/
rftpocs542/ (P.R.C.); see also Fonda Y. Duvanel, The Evolution and Enforcement of Computer
Software Copyright in the People’s Republic of China, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L 337,
344–47 (1996) (discussing rationale behind the Computer Software Protection Regulations).
60
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Nonetheless, as demonstrated in Part IV, Chinese courts have applied the doctrine
in other contexts with varying degrees of coherency since the early 1990s. 68
III. THE ELUSIVE IDEA/EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY IN CHINESE LAW
A. Existing Scholarship on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in China
There is surprisingly little English-language scholarship on the
idea/expression dichotomy in Chinese law. In Intellectual Property in China, for
instance, Peter Feng acknowledges that Chinese courts have applied the doctrine,
but devotes only a few paragraphs to the topic. 69 Similarly, Zheng Chengsi and
Michael Pendleton merely allude to the dichotomy in Copyright Law in China, 70
and Peter Ganea and Thomas Pattloch only mention it in passing in their 2005
textbook. 71 Surprisingly, Zheng Chengsi and Xue Hong do not address it at all in
Chinese Intellectual Property Law in the 21st Century. 72 While Jiarui Liu and
Fang Fang have written a short English-language article addressing the
idea/expression dichotomy in China, their exposition of it is limited to only a few
cases 73 and is secondary to a larger argument about Internet copyright. 74 In

68

See infra Part IV.
See FENG, supra note 58, at 67–68, 76 (noting that although Chinese law did not codify the
idea/expression dichotomy, courts could apply it on the basis of “jurisprudence,” i.e., the “general
principles and doctrines that inform copyright systems in general”).
70
See ZHENG CHENGSI & PENDLETON, supra note 36, at 67 (noting that some members of
Copyright Law Drafting Committee interpreted certain U.S. copyright cases as “protect[ing] both
‘form’ and ‘content’ of a work, not merely form of expression”); id. at 83 (observing that
exclusion of news reports from copyright protection “tends to blur” the “ideas/form of expression
dichotomy”).
71
See PETER GANEA & THOMAS PATTLOCH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 215
(Christopher Heath ed., 2005) (under reproducibility requirement of Chinese law, “[m]ere ideas
which are not expressed by any means are excluded from protection”); id. at 228 (exclusion of
calendars, numerical tables, formulas, etc., from copyright protection reflects the “general
principle that information, ideas, operational modes, and so on are not copyright protected as
such”).
72
See generally XUE HONG & ZHENG CHENGSI, supra note 63.
73
Jiarui Liu & Fang Fang, The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Cyberspace: A Comparative
Study of Web Page Copyrights in the United States and in China, 25 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
504, 507–09 (2003), available at http://works.bepress.com/jiarui_liu/2/.
74
Jiarui Liu and Fang Fang spend much of their article explaining the significance of network
effects, arguing: “Chinese copyright laws should define industrial standards as unprotectable ideas
to facilitate their widespread imitation or adoption.” Id. at 509–14. While their exposition of the
idea/expression dichotomy in Chinese law is limited, they do recognize that “copyright statutes
[have] seemingly failed to give detailed and practical guidelines about the idea/expression
dichotomy,” and maintain that further legislation is needed. Id. at 514.
69
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general, existing scholarship contains little discussion of the contours of the
doctrine in Chinese law or the manner in which it is applied in Chinese courts. 75
Based on the relative paucity of Western scholarship on the idea/expression
dichotomy and the Copyright Law’s apparent silence on the topic, it may be
tempting to infer that the doctrine is not widely recognized in China. Yet
according to Chinese scholar Chen Jiaqiang, the dichotomy has been “universally
accepted” and is currently a “hot topic” in China. 76 Indeed, Chinese courts now
routinely apply the doctrine, 77 and Chinese legal experts have published several
articles on it in recent years. 78 These scholars recognize the dichotomy’s
fundamental significance in copyright law, 79 as well as its important policy
functions. Feng Xiaoqing, for example, writes that the doctrine balances the
public interest against authors’ incentives, accommodates free speech, and
protects the public domain. 80 Nonetheless, commentators also observe that the
dichotomy is underdeveloped in Chinese law. As one scholar states, “even
though it has been called a ‘basic’ principle,” the idea/expression dichotomy is
currently “awkward.” 81
75

Jiarui Liu and Fang Fang’s article is an exception to this general observation. Jiarui Liu
and Fang Fang discuss a well-known case from the early 1990s, as well as two more recent cases
involving Internet copyright. Id. at 507–09. Zheng Chengsi has also published summaries of two
early cases applying the doctrine, ZHENG CHENGSI, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT IN
CHINA: LEADING CASES AND COMMENTARY 17–42 (1997), which are discussed herein, see infra
Part IV.A.
76
Chen Jiaqiang, Zhu zuo quan fa zhong si xiang yu biao da er fen fa yuan ze de jiedu yu
chong gou [An Interpretation and Reconstruction of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright
Law], 29 DALIAN DA XUE XUE BAO [J. DALIAN UNIV.], No. 2, at 107, 108 (2008).
77
See infra Part IV.B.
78
See, e.g., Yang Tianhong & Ma Jing, Qian yi si xiang yu biao da er fen fa [Discussing the
Idea/Expression Dichotomy], 2009 FA ZHI YU SHE HUI [LEGAL SYS. & SOC’Y], No. 16, at 306;
Wang Yue & Xu Jianfei, Ban quan fa si xiang, biao da er fen fa ji qi fa zhan—yi li yi ping heng
wei fen xi gong ju [The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law and its Development: Using
Interest Balancing as an Analytical Tool], 24 NAN TONG DA XUE XUE BAO (SHE HUI KE XUE BAN)
NAN TONG UNIV. J. (SOC. SCI. ED.), No. 3, at 100 (2008); Zhang Feifei, Lun si xiang yu biao da er
fen yuan ze de chan sheng [On the Emergence of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy Principle], 2008
ZHONGGUO SHANG JIE [BUS. CHINA], No. 2, at 213; Li Yufeng, Si xiang / biao da er fen fa de jian
tao [Reflections on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy], 8 BEI DA FA LÜ PING LUN [PEKING UNIV. L.
REV.] 433, 433 (2007).
79
See Xiao Jun, supra note 8, at 73 (“The idea/expression dichotomy has been called a basic
principle of copyright law.”); Chen Jiaqiang, supra note 76, at 107 (the idea/expression dichotomy
“is seen as a self-evident principle of copyright law”).
80
Feng Xiaoqing, Zhu zuo quan fa zhong si xiang yu biao da er fen fa yuan ze tan xi [A Probe
into the Idea/Expression Dichotomy Principle in Copyright Law], 33 HUNAN WEN LI XUE YUAN
XUE BAO (SHE HUI KE XUE BAN) [J. HUNAN UNIV. ARTS & SCI. (SOC. SCI. ED.)], No. 1, at 71, 72, 75
(2008).
81
Xiao Jun, supra note 79, at 73.
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The Chinese legal literature reveals that scholars have acknowledged the
idea/expression dichotomy since the early 1980s, several years prior to the
passage of the Copyright Law. 82 Since that time, however, the doctrine’s
meaning has been a matter of almost constant debate and confusion. The next
section, Part III.B, describes the translational difficulties, cultural factors, and
major conceptual disagreements that have contributed to the dichotomy’s
elusiveness. Part III.C then addresses the Copyright Law’s shortcomings,
showing that it not only fails to provide authority for the idea/expression
dichotomy, but in fact exacerbates the confusion surrounding it. As shall be
discussed in Part IV, it is against this turbulent backdrop that Chinese courts have
attempted to articulate and apply the dichotomy.
B. Disagreeing on Three Articles of Law: The Idea/Expression Dichotomy’s
Early Development in China
The Chinese legal community’s failure to agree on the precise meaning of
the idea/expression dichotomy over the past few decades may be due, in part,
to translational problems. 83 For years Chinese legal scholars debated the
proper translation for “copyright,” to say nothing of the terminology required
to express complicated and unfamiliar copyright doctrines. 84 Translating the

82

See, e.g., Yin Lantian & Chen Hong, Jin kuai zhi ding shi he wo guo guo qing de ban quan
fa: fang Zhongguo chu ban gong zuo zhe xie hui ban quan yan jiu xiao zu Shen Rengan tong zhi
[Quickly Establish a Copyright Law Suitable to Chinese Conditions: An Interview with Comrade
Shen Rengan of the Chinese Publishing Workers’ Association Copyright Research Group], 1983
FA XUE ZA ZHI [J. LEGAL STUD.], No. 3, at 35, 36 (stating that copyright does not protect
“thoughts, content, [or] facts,” but only the “form” in which thoughts, content, or facts are
expressed). Legal scholarship on copyright was quite sparse in the first few years of the 1980’s.
Mark Sidel indicates that “[u]ntil 1982 no scholarly books or articles on copyright protection had
appeared in the Chinese legal literature, and it was not until late 1983 that a detailed study publicly
appeared” that recommended the establishment of a copyright statute. Mark Sidel, The Legal
Protection of Copyright and the Rights of Authors in the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1984:
Prelude to the Chinese Copyright Law, 9 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 477, 498 (1984–1985) (citing
Huang Qinnan, Lun bao hu zhu zuo quan [Protecting Copyright], 1983 FA XUE YAN JIU [CHINESE
J.L.], No. 2, at 47).
83
Cf. Sun Peng, Dui “Idea/Expression Dichotomy” de ren shi [Knowledge of the
“Idea/Expression Dichotomy”], 2008 HEILONGJIANG SHENG ZHENG FA GUAN LI GAN BU XUE YUAN
XUE BAO [J. HEILONGJIANG ADMIN. CADRE INST. POL. & L.], No. 5, at 61, 61 (discussing ways in
which “idea/expression dichotomy” has been translated in Chinese).
84
See Zheng Chengsi, Shi lun wo guo zhu zuo quan fa xiu ding de bi yao xing [On the
Necessity of Amending China’s Copyright Law], 1994 ZHU ZUO QUAN [COPYRIGHT], No. 3, at 27,
27–28 (arguing that the Copyright Law ought to be amended so as to specify the relationship
between the terms banquan and zhuzuoquan, both of which were in use as translations for
“copyright”); Zhang Yongjiang, Qian tan ban quan he zhu zuo quan [Discussing “Copyright” and
“Copyright”], 1988 FA LÜ SHI YONG [J.L. APPLICATION], No. 1, at 20, 20 (describing three

[1:62 2010]

CYBARIS™, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW

76

idea/expression dichotomy into Chinese is especially tricky, for the English terms
“idea” and “expression,” as used in the copyright context, are both inherently
ambiguous; “idea,” for instance, proxies for facts, processes, procedures,
formulas, and other unprotectable subject matter. Which Chinese term best
approximates this notion: linian (“idea”), sixiang (“thought”), chuangyi
(“creativity”), neirong (“content”), or gainian (“concept”)? Tellingly, when
Taiwan first attempted to codify the idea/expression dichotomy, it abandoned the
effort out of frustration due to the difficulty of defining the relevant terms. 85
The idea/expression dichotomy may also clash with traditional Chinese
culture, which to some extent equates the ideas expressed in a work with the
expression itself. Confucianism not only tolerates copying, but considers it an
“important living process” by which one learns from and retransmits another’s
wisdom and knowledge. 86 Copying is a means of “tapp[ing] into [the] moral
quality” of another’s artistic expression. 87 For this reason, “replication of
particular concrete manifestations . . . by persons other than those who first gave
them form” has historically been encouraged.88 This conflation of a work’s
expressive form with the wisdom that it communicates makes a Confucian analog
to the idea/expression distinction rather unlikely, and may be partially to blame
for the conceptual challenge that the doctrine has presented in China. 89
In addition to — and perhaps, to some extent, because of — translational
difficulties and cultural particularities, the idea/expression dichotomy has been the
subject of extensive theoretical disagreement in China. In the years leading up to
competing terms: banquan, zuozhequan, and zhuzuoquan); Mark Sidel, supra note 82, at 480–81
(describing “terminological weakness in the definition of copyright” in Chinese).
85
Xiao Jun, supra note 8, at 73. When Taiwan eventually codified the doctrine, it enumerated
the categories of unprotectable subject matter in a manner that closely tracks Section 102(b) of the
U.S. Copyright Act. See Zhu zuo quan fa [Copyright Act] (promulgated by Nationalist Gov’t of
Republic of China, May 14, 1928, amended May 13, 2009) art. 10bis (R.O.C.) (“Protection for
copyright . . . shall not extend to the work’s underlying ideas, procedures, production processes,
systems, methods of operation, concepts, principles, or discoveries.”), translated at
http://www.giprs.org/node/299.
86
Peter K. Yu, Symposium: W(h)ither the Middleman: The Role and Future of Intermediaries
in the Information Age: Of Monks, Medieval Scribes, and Middlemen, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1,
28 (2006).
87
Jonathan Ocko, Copying, Culture, and Control: Chinese Intellectual Property Law in
Historical Context, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 559, 569 (1996) (book review).
88
ALFORD, supra note 46, at 28 (quoting Wen Fong, The Problem of Forgeries in Chinese
Painting, 25 ARTIBUS ASIAE 95, 100 (1962)).
89
See Zhou Dafeng, Zhongguo gu dai zhu zuo quan fa tan yuan [The Origin of Ancient
Chinese Copyright Law], 2009 SHANG YE WEN HUA (XUE SHU BAN) [BUS. CULTURE (ACADEMIC
ED.)], No. 2, at 136, 136 (ancient Chinese notions of literature are “incompatible with the
‘idea/expression’ dichotomy in modern copyright systems”).
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the passage of the Copyright Law, many scholars acknowledged the doctrine,
stating for instance that “[c]opyright only protects a work’s ‘expressive form,’ and
not the content, thoughts, ideas, or viewpoints reflected in a work.” 90 This view
of copyright was not universal, however; legal experts advocated a wide range of
theories as to where the line ought to be drawn between protected and unprotected
subject matter. 91 In the absence of governing law, Chinese courts and other
adjudicative bodies likewise failed to achieve consensus; although litigation
frequently presented questions as to the scope of copyright, one commentator
observed that “[c]ourt decisions are inconsistent, and in fact are widely
divergent.” 92 Even after years of debate, the boundaries of copyright were still
the focus of widespread disagreement in the late 1980s. 93
This indeterminacy came to a head in 1989 with a widely-publicized
copyright dispute that directly implicated the idea/expression dichotomy. In
authoring a dramatic work entitled Number One Restaurant Under Heaven, the
defendant had drawn from a historical work on Quanjude, one of Beijing’s most
famous restaurants. 94 He had borrowed facts and other information from the
Quanjude book, but had purportedly copied only a small amount of text. 95 The
plaintiff complained to the Beijing Copyright Bureau, which adjudicated the
90

Nan Zhenhua, Shi lun ban quan bao hu zhong de fu zhi, jia mao, piao qie he qiao he de ren
ding [Determining Copying, Counterfeiting, Plagiarism, and Coincidence in Copyright
Protection], 1987 ZHENG ZHI YU FA LÜ [POL. & L.], No. 4, at 16, 18; see also Guo Dengke, Zhu
zuo quan ke ti de gou cheng yao jian [The Composite Elements of the Object of Copyright], 1989
HEBEI FA XUE [HEBEI LEGAL STUD.], No. 6, at 27, 27 (copyright does not protect a “thought
itself,” but only its “individual expressive form”).
91
See, e.g., Wei Zhi, Xi ban quan dui zuo pin nei rong de bao hu [Analyzing Copyright’s
Protection of Works’ Content], 1989 FA XUE [LEGAL STUD.], No. 1, at 28, 29 (arguing that
“copyright protects both a work’s form and its content,” but not “general” principles or facts);
Zheng Chengsi, Zuo zhe, zhu zuo wu yu ban quan [Authors, Literary Works, and Copyright], 1989
ZHI SHI CHAN QUAN [INTELL. PROP.], No. 1, at 10, 11 (criticizing view that “copyright only
protects a thought’s expressive form,” stating that “[t]he ‘form’ referred to . . . is not the work’s
medium, but rather the work itself”); Fu Dingsheng, Ban quan bao hu de shi zuo pin de biao xian
xing shi: tan ban quan ke ti de zai ti xing [Copyright Only Protects a Work’s Expressive Form:
Discussing the ‘Medium-ness’ of the Object of Copyright], 1988 FA XUE [LEGAL STUD.], No.1., at
34, 35 (“Copyright protection does not contemplate a work’s content.”).
92
Fu Dingsheng, supra note 91, at 34.
93
See Wei Zhi, supra note 91, at 28 (as of 1989, scope of copyright protection still the subject
of extensive legislative, practical, and theoretical debate). Notably, Professor Wei predicted that
questions as to the limits of copyright protection could be resolved through actual litigation, caseby-case. Id. at 29.
94
Huang Weijun, “Tian xia di yi lou” ban quan jiu fen suo yin qi de yu lun dui lei [The Public
Opinion Dispute That Number One Restaurant Under Heaven Triggered], 1989 ZHONGGUO XI JU
[CHINESE DRAMA] 26, 26.
95
Wu Haimin, “Wo yao gao zhuang!” [“I’m Going to Sue!”], http://vip.book.sina.com.cn/
book/chapter_76116_50356.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).
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dispute. 96 The controversy sparked extensive debate as to the scope of copyright
— did copyright merely prohibit the reproduction of expression, or did it also
preclude the borrowing of facts and other “content”? 97 Unfortunately, the Beijing
Copyright Bureau’s decision did little to clarify the matter. Finding that the
defendant had borrowed “a small portion of text and content,” the bureau ordered
him to publish an explanation in a newspaper, acknowledging that he had taken
“facts” from the Quanjude history book. 98
The controversy extended to the Copyright Law Drafting Committee as well.
Zheng Chengsi, who served on the committee, indicates that many committee
members were “disturbed” by the “total concept and feel” cases 99 in the United
States. 100 They read these cases as extending protection to “both ‘form’ and
‘content’ of a work, not merely form of expression.” 101 While the American
cases may rightly be criticized, 102 the drafters’ repulsion reflects both the terms in
which the Quanjude debate was framed 103 and the rigid view of the
idea/expression dichotomy that many Chinese scholars advocated: that copyright
should only extend to a work’s “form” (xingshi), or expression in the most literal
sense — “text, graphics, and other such external forms” 104 — and that the rest of

96

Id.
See Chang Lin, Beijing ban quan jiu fen re tou shi [Perspectives on Beijing Copyright
Disputes], 1989 TI YU BO LAN [SPORTS VISION], No. 8, at 42, 42–43 (describing legal questions
raised by the debate); Zhu zuo quan fa xue li lun yan tao hui zong shu [Summary of Copyright
Legal Theory Conference], 1989 FA XUE JIA [JURISTS REV.], No. 6, at 28, 28 (summarizing various
legal experts’ opinions on the dispute).
98
Wu Haimin, supra note 95.
99
See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1167 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that defendants captured the “total concept and feel” of the
plaintiffs’ television show (quoting Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110
(9th Cir. 1970))).
100
ZHENG CHENGSI & PENDLETON, supra note 36, at 68.
101
Id. Zheng Chengsi observes that “[c]ontent in some undefined way in various drafters’
minds was seen as different to [sic] ideas.”
102
See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 4-13 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 13.03[A][1][c] (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 2009)
More broadly, the touchstone of ‘total concept and feel’ threatens to subvert the
very essence of copyright, namely the protection of original expression.
‘Concepts’ are statutorily ineligible for copyright protection; for courts to advert
to a work’s ‘total concept’ as the essence of its protectable character seems illadvised in the extreme.
(emphasis original).
103
See Chang Lin, supra note 97, at 43 (“The central question is whether copyright, in
addition to a work’s expressive form, protects the work’s content.”).
104
Chen Jiaqiang, supra note 76, at 108.
97
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the work — its “content,” or neirong — should not be protected. 105 Despite the
drafters’ apparent preference for this theory (and the obvious need for statutory
guidance 106 ), the committee ultimately failed to codify this or any other version of
the dichotomy. Nonetheless, by the early 1990s, this narrow “content/form”
conceptualization of the doctrine had become quite popular. 107
There are obvious problems with this formulation. Most seriously, it
contradicts other exclusive rights guaranteed under the Copyright Law. As Chen
Jiaqiang points out, the content/form theory fails to explain the rights of
translation and adaptation, which extend past the outward “form” of a work and
protect some of its underlying “content” (such as plot). 108 Thus, as Zheng
Chengsi argued in a forceful rebuttal of the theory in 1997, if “severe restrictions
are not placed upon this principle,” it will “give a ‘green light’ to most infringing
activities, save for verbatim copying, and copyright protection will ultimately
come to nothing.” 109 In its place, Professor Zheng advocated a less rigid
“thought/expression” (sixiang/biaoda) formulation. 110
This view, which
essentially mirrors the idea/expression dichotomy in U.S. law, was reportedly
widely accepted in the Chinese legal world by the late 1990s. 111 However, the
lasting influence of the content/form theory in Chinese copyright law is
observable to this day, and the theory (albeit in a somewhat less rigid form) still
enjoys some scholarly support. 112
Thus, while the distinction between ideas and expression is inherently fuzzy
— as Learned Hand said, no matter where the line is drawn, it will “seem
105

Id.; see also Zhu zuo quan fa xue li lun yan tao hui zong shu [Summary of Copyright Legal
Theory Conference], supra note 97, at 28 (quoting Professor Guo Shoukang as saying, “That
copyright protects a work’s expressive form and not its ideological content is a principle of
copyright law that embodies the legislative aims of copyright.”); Fu Dingsheng, supra note 91, at
34 (“The object of copyright is just the expressive form, and does not include the content
expressed in a work”); Bai Xingcheng, Ban quan zhi shi [Copyright Knowledge], 1986 DANG AN
[ARCHIVES], No. 5, at 41, 41 (“Copyright only protects a work’s form, and not a work’s
content.”).
106
In discussing the Quanjude dispute, one commentator wrote, “without a legal yardstick, it
is extremely difficult to fairly resolve problems inherent to the social process of disseminating
culture.” Chang Lin, supra note 97, at 43.
107
Chen Jiaqiang, supra note 76, at 108.
108
Id. Chen also notes that the content/form formulation does not account for the perceived
expansion of copyright protection in U.S. cases. Id.
109
ZHENG CHENGSI, BAN QUAN FA [Copyright Law] 41 (1997).
110
See id. at 41–48.
111
Chen Jiaqiang, supra note 76, at 108.
112
See id. at 108, 110 (describing a more liberal content/expressive form (neirong/biaoda
xingshi) iteration, under which “form” would include not only such elements as text, but also
structure, genre, and so forth; nonetheless, “form” would still be rather precisely and strictly
defined, in contrast to the perceived open-endedness of the American approach to “expression”).

[1:62 2010]

CYBARIS™, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW

80

arbitrary” 113 — the doctrine is particularly complicated in the Chinese context. In
addition to (and arguably owing to) cultural and linguistic challenges, members of
the Chinese legal community have had substantial difficulty agreeing upon the
doctrine’s basic meaning. And as the following section demonstrates, the
statutory regime has done little to mediate the uncertainty surrounding the
dichotomy.
C. Searching (in Vain) for the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Chinese Statutory
Law
In explaining the idea/expression dichotomy, Chinese scholars tend to refer
primarily to U.S. rather than Chinese law. 114 While this might have to do with the
fact that the doctrine is “most mature” in the U.S., 115 it may also be the case that
finding the doctrine is simply more difficult in Chinese law. The Software
Regulations provide, in language similar to the WIPO Copyright Treaty and
TRIPs Agreement, that copyright “shall not extend to the ideas, processing,
operating methods, mathematical concepts, or the like used in software
development.” 116 However, as previously noted, no similar provision has been
promulgated with respect to other classes of copyrightable works. 117
Nonetheless, Chinese legal experts have occasionally attempted to identify a
basis for the idea/expression dichotomy within the four corners of generally
applicable copyright law. While the Copyright Law provides no explicit statutory
authority for the dichotomy, there are two provisions from which it may arguably
be inferred: Article 5 of the Copyright Law, which exempts several categories of
works from copyright coverage; and Article 2 of the Copyright Law
Implementing Regulations (“Implementing Regulations”), which imposes a
113

Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930).
See, e.g., Chen Jiaqiang, supra note 76, at 107–08; Wang Yue & Xu Jianfei, supra note 78,
at 101–102; Li Yufeng, supra note 78, at 435–39; Xiao Jun, supra note 8, at 75–76; Feng
Xiaoqing, Zhu zuo quan fa zhong si xiang yu biao da “er fen fa” de fa lü yu jing ji xue fen xi [A
Legal and Economic Analysis of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law], YUNNAN DA
XUE XUE BAO (FA XUE BAN) [J. YUNNAN UNIV. (L. ED.)], No. 1, at 28, 28–30 (2004).
115
Xiao Jun, supra note 8, at 73.
116
Regulation for Computer Software Protection (promulgated by the State Council, Dec. 20,
2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002) art. 6, available at http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo2008/zcfg/
flfg/bq/fljxzfg/200804/t20080403_369365.html, translated at http://www.lehmanlaw.com/
resource-centre/laws-and-regulations/information-technology/regulation-for-computer-softwareprotection.html; cf. World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. 2, Dec. 20,
1996, 112 Stat. 2860, 36 I.L.M. 65 (“Copyright protection extends to expressions and not to ideas,
procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such.”).
117
As Jiarui Liu and Fang Fang put it, China’s “copyright statutes [have] seemingly failed to
give detailed and practical guidelines about the idea/expression dichotomy.” Jiarui Liu & Fang
Fang, supra note 73, at 514.
114
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“reproducibility” requirement on copyrighted works. A close examination of
these provisions, however, reveals that neither affords a sound basis for the
idea/expression distinction. If anything, the provisions only contribute to the
doctrine’s ambiguity.
1. Copyright Law, Article 5
Article 5 of the Copyright Law exempts several classes of works from
copyright protection, including the following: “(2) news on current affairs; and
(3) calendars, numerical tables and forms of general use, and formulas.” 118
Subsection (2) is interpreted narrowly to cover only works consisting of “purely
factual information” 119 or “pure news” — works that merely communicate
information and do not include the author’s opinions, analysis, or other “creative
labour.” 120 Likewise, the works enumerated in subsection (3) are seen as
belonging to the realm of “common knowledge.” 121 Because these two
provisions primarily concern noncreative, factual works, some commentators
have claimed that they reflect the “general principle that information, ideas,
operational modes, and so on are not copyright protected as such.” 122
Inferring an idea/expression distinction from Article 5, however, is
problematic. As Zheng Chengsi (who advocated that Article 5 be included in the
statute) 123 concedes, the news exemption “tends to blur,” rather than elucidate, the
dichotomy. 124 While reported facts are no doubt uncopyrightable, even “purely
factual” articles possess literary and other expressive qualities that would, in the
absence of the categorical exemption, merit protection. Strangely, under the
exemption, an author obtains copyright in a news-based work through the
inclusion of opinion, reflection, or analysis — ideas, rather than original
expression. 125 Similarly, many of the categories of works in subsection (3) may
potentially exhibit original creative expression and, were it not for the exemption,
qualify for copyright protection. 126 Hence, these exemptions are more likely
118

PRC Copyright Law arts. 5(2)–(3).
GANEA & PATTLOCH, supra note 71, at 228.
120
ZHENG CHENGSI , supra note 75, at 37.
121
FENG, supra note 58, at 84.
122
GANEA & PATTLOCH, supra note 71, at 228; see also Jiarui Liu & Fang Fang, supra note
73, at 507 (asserting that Article 5 of the Copyright Law, “if properly interpreted, to a sizeable
extent overlaps with [Section 102(b)] of the US Copyright Act of 1976”).
123
ZHENG CHENGSI, supra note 75, at 39.
124
ZHENG CHENGSI & PENDLETON, supra note 36, at 83.
125
See FENG, supra note 58, at 85 (“A news report attracts copyright if the reporter registers
comments or reflections.” (emphasis added)).
126
Just like telephone directories, calendars, tables, and forms are informational or factual
works. While such works may normally only be eligible for a “thin” copyright, there is room for
original expression in their presentation, as well as in their selection, arrangement, and
119
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indicative of policy (i.e., that certain classes of works should not receive
protection per se) 127 than a doctrinal distinction between facts or ideas and
expression.
That Article 5 obscures the distinction between ideas and expression is
evident from a recent news-related copyright dispute. In 2008, the governmentrun China News Service (“CNS”) sued a private website, hc360.com, for
retransmitting thousands of CNS news articles without authorization. 128
Hc360.com defended its actions on the basis of the news reporting exception.129
CNS responded by arguing that many of the news articles were entitled to
copyright, not because they exhibited original expression, but because they
“included the opinions of CNS editorial staff.” 130 While hc360 impliedly
appropriated the expression of those opinions as well, CNS’s imprecise legal
argument both reflects and perpetuates Article 5’s failure to distinguish ideas
from original expression. As this demonstrates, the provision serves more to
obscure the doctrine than to support it.
2. Copyright Law Implementing Regulations, Article 2
Scholars and (less frequently) judges have similarly attempted to infer the
idea/expression distinction from Article 2 of the Implementing Regulations,
which provides that works must be “capable of being reproduced in a certain
tangible form” in order to qualify for copyright. 131 In a 2008 decision, for
coordination of facts. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 356–57
(1992).
127
A structural argument supports this reading as well. The two exemptions just discussed
are juxtaposed with subsection (1) of Article 5, which exempts government documents “of a
legislative, administrative or judicial nature” from copyright. PRC Copyright Law art. 5(1). As
these documents are neither “purely factual” nor “common knowledge,” the idea/expression
dichotomy cannot easily be inferred from this exemption, which appears side-by-side with the
exemptions in subsections (2) and (3). Id. at (2), (3).
128
China News Service Sues E-Commerce Site, http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/cases/copyright/
237304.shtml (last visited Apr. 4, 2009).
129
Id.
130
Id. (emphasis added); see also Zhang Ming, Zhongguo xin wen wang xiang “na lai zhu yi”
shuo bu [China News Service Says “No” to Free Riding], REN MIN RI BAO [PEOPLE’S DAILY],
Apr. 14, 2008, available at http://health.chinanews.cn/it/hlwxw/news/2008/04-14/1219455.shtml
(CNS claimed that the articles “were not pure news, but were topical articles that also included the
reporters’ and editors’ views and other information” (emphasis added)).
131
Implementing Regulations of the Copyright Law (promulgated by the State Council, Aug.
2, 2002, effective Sept. 15, 2002) art. 2, translated at http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/laws/
laws/copyright/232725.shtml [hereinafter Implementing Regulations]. In contrast to the
Implementing Regulations, U.S. copyright law requires that copyrighted works be “fixed in [a]
tangible medium of expression.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). “Since the [PRC Copyright Law]
does not require a work to be fixed in tangible form, works expressed in non-tangible means, for
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example, the Sichuan High People’s Court stated that it was “evident” from
Article 2 that copyright protects “the manner of expressing ideas and emotions,
and not the concepts themselves.” 132 Zheng Chengsi struck a similar chord in his
rebuttal to the concept/form theory, arguing that because thoughts and theories
“lack reproducibility” they cannot possibly be infringed (or even protected). 133 In
other words, if an idea has not yet been committed to some expressive form
(written, spoken, or otherwise) it is not “capable of being reproduced in a certain
tangible form,” and therefore must fall outside of the scope of copyright.
The problem with this approach is that even after a fact or idea has been
committed to some expressive form from which it can be reproduced, that form
may nonetheless fail to merit copyright protection. An example would be the
phone directory in Feist; although the facts had been arranged in the directory,
and therefore were “capable of being reproduced in a certain tangible form,” the
directory nonetheless did not enjoy copyright protection because it did not exhibit
sufficient creativity. 134 As is discussed at greater length below, Chinese courts
have reached the same conclusion in similar cases,135 effectively barring
noncreative — but nonetheless reproducible — works from copyright protection.
Because reproducibility constitutes a necessary, but insufficient, prerequisite for
copyright protection, Article 2 is at best an imperfect source for the
idea/expression dichotomy.
In sum, the law on the books neither articulates, nor provides a sound basis for
inferring, the idea/expression dichotomy in contexts other than computer
software. 136 In a civil law system that lacks stare decisis, the absence of a
example by stage performance, are generally protectable provided they can be reproduced in a
tangible form.” GANEA & PATTLOCH, supra note 71, at 215.
132
Zhang Chengxuan v. Zhang Jixiang (Sichuan High People’s Ct., Mar. 28, 2008), available
at http://ipr.chinacourt.org/public/detail_sfws.php?id=24238.
133
ZHENG CHENGSI, supra note 109, at 48.
134
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362–63 (1991).
135
See, e.g., Guo Kun v. Huang Zhenqiao (Jiangsu High People’s Ct., Nov. 18, 2008),
available at http://ipr.chinacourt.org/public/detail_sfws.php?id=25392 (simply listing 12
ingredients used to make medicinal soup according to their names did not constitute original
expression); see also infra Part IV.B.4.
136
One might argue that, in the absence of statutory guidance, Chinese courts may directly
apply the idea/expression dichotomy as codified in an international treaty to which China is a
party, such as the WIPO Copyright Treaty or TRIPs Agreement. There is some disagreement as to
whether treaties are self-executing in China. See Randall Peerenboom, The Evolving Regulatory
Framework of Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the People’s Republic of China, 1 ASIAN-PAC.
L. & POL’Y J. 12, 15 (2000) (claiming that “[t]reaties are self-executing in China”). But see Peter
K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in Post-WTO
China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901, 907 (2006) (“[I]nternational treaties in China are far from selfexecuting”). Article 142 of the General Principles of the Civil Law provides that the terms of a
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statutory source for such a foundational principle represents a significant
shortcoming, and has almost certainly contributed to the Chinese legal
community’s confusion and disagreement over the doctrine’s proper scope and
application. The drafters’ failure to “agree on three articles of law” thus presents
a real predicament for the courts, which are tasked with determining the scope of
copyright in actual cases. 137
IV. THE IDEA/EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY ON THE GROUND IN CHINESE COURTS
Although the Copyright Law does not expressly provide for the
idea/expression dichotomy, modern Chinese courts nonetheless apply it fairly
routinely. 138 Peter Feng explains that in the 1980s, when copyright was still
governed by the provisional and incomplete terms of the Trial Regulations,
Chinese courts began applying principles drawn from the “jurisprudence” (fali),
meaning “the general principles and doctrines that inform copyright systems in
general.” 139 Feng writes that the courts’ reliance on the jurisprudence “enabled
copyright to be justified on principles far beyond the limited [Trial Regulations]

treaty may only be applied in the event of conflict with domestic law. However, “[w]hether
treaties are ever in practice self-executing in China is questionable. Despite the language of the
General Principles of Civil Law, there are few examples of China enforcing the provisions of an
international treaty absent domestic legislation.” Benjamin L. Liebman, Autonomy Through
Separation?: Environmental Law and the Basic Law of Hong Kong, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 231, 277
n. 214 (1998). At the very least, Chinese courts seem resistant to directly applying international
treaties. For instance, in a widely-publicized 2008 trade dress decision, the Supreme
People’s Court chided a lower court for directly applying the Paris Convention, and instead
construed PRC law so as to properly resolve the dispute. Meng Te Sha Foods Ltd. v. Ferrero
S.p.A. (Sup. People’s Ct., Mar. 24, 2008), available at http://ipr.chinacourt.org/public/
detail_sfws.php?id=16266. Thus, it seems more likely that a Chinese court would infer the
idea/expression dichotomy from Chinese law—especially since the Copyright Law does not
actually contradict the doctrine—rather than apply a treaty directly.
137
Formally, the lower courts are quite limited in their authority to interpret law. See CHOW,
supra note 9, at 169 (“In China, courts do not play such a central role in the legal system and, with
the notable exception of the Supreme People’s Court, have only a limited role in the interpretation
of laws.”). But the task of applying law to fact necessarily involves some degree of interpretation.
This is evident from published case decisions in China, which are “increasingly similar to the
‘findings of fact and conclusions of law’ published by federal district courts in the United States.”
Chris X. Lin, A Quiet Revolution: An Overview of China’s Judicial Reform, 4 ASIAN-PAC. L. &
POL’Y J. 255, 303 (2003).
138
That this is the case may be gleaned from a survey of reported court decisions posted at the
Supreme People’s Court’s Intellectual Property Division’s website. See Zhongguo zhi shi chan
quan cai pan wen shu wang [China Intellectual Property Judgment Net], http://ipr.chinacourt.org/
(last visited Dec. 3, 2009). The cases discussed in this article are intended to illustrate trends in
modern judicial decision-making relative to the idea/expression dichotomy, but do not constitute a
comprehensive body of idea/expression case law.
139
FENG, supra note 58, at 67.
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provisions.” 140 The idea/expression dichotomy is one of the general copyright
doctrines that Chinese courts have imported from outside China’s statutory
copyright regime. 141 Because judges have borne the primary responsibility for
expounding the doctrine’s meaning and scope in China, despite formal limitations
on their lawmaking authority, 142 the idea/expression dichotomy essentially
constitutes a judge-made doctrine of Chinese copyright law. 143
While early cases articulating the dichotomy left much to be desired, modern
decisions evince an increasingly coherent and sophisticated view of it. The
following section describes two well-known cases from the 1990s that
acknowledge the doctrine, but which fail to provide a satisfactory explanation of
it. The subsequent section then demonstrates, through a detailed analysis of
recent case law, that modern courts have developed a much firmer (but still
imperfect) grasp of the idea/expression distinction. This finding supports the
view that Chinese courts are more competent and active in developing substantive
law than is generally appreciated.
A. The Murky Early Cases
In light of the conceptual uncertainty and statutory defects described in Part
III, it should come as no surprise that the early idea/expression decisions are not
beacons of clarity. The case most frequently cited 144 as proof of China’s early
recognition of the doctrine is Li Shuxian v. Jia Yinghua, 145 which was decided
shortly after the Copyright Law took effect. Li Shuxian, the widow of China’s
last emperor, Pu Yi, arranged with Jia Yinghua to publish a book about the
emperor. 146 Another man, Wang Qingxiang, then managed to persuade Li to
collaborate with him rather than Jia; their book was published in 1987. 147 Jia
nevertheless continued his own research, traveling around China to collect
information and speak with Pu Yi’s family members and associates. 148 When Jia
published his book, Li and Wang sued him for copyright infringement. 149 Jia
denied having copied their book, claiming that his was his own independent
140

Id.
Id. at 67–68.
142
See supra notes 9, 137 and accompanying text.
143
Indeed, in applying the idea/expression dichotomy, Chinese judges rarely attempt to find a
statutory hook for it. They typically state the doctrine as a self-evident principle of copyright law.
144
See, e.g., ZHENG CHENGSI, supra note 75, at 19–20; CHENG RONGBIN & JIANG
XIAOCHUAN, ZHI SHI CHAN QUAN: AN LI, FA GUI, SHI TI [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES,
REGULATIONS, AND QUESTIONS] 47–48 (2006); Jiarui Liu & Fang Fang, supra note 73, at 507–08.
145
ZHENG CHENGSI, supra note 75, at 17.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 17–18.
148
Id. at 18.
149
Id.
141
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creation and that the coincidence of historical facts in the two works was
inevitable. 150
The court ruled in Jia’s favor, holding that the repetition of historical facts
alone does not give rise to infringement. 151 Commentators therefore interpret Li
Shuxian as authority for the principle that, consistent with the idea/expression
dichotomy, facts are not copyrightable. 152 While the court did impliedly
recognize the dichotomy, it shed little light on its contours. The court’s brief
decision suggests partiality to the content/form formulation: whereas the court
described historical facts as “content,” it held that Jia had exhibited originality in
his “expressive form.” 153 Indeed, the case has been praised for its apparent
refusal to recognize copyright in nonliteral expression.154 Yet the court also listed
“creative style” as a component of “form,” 155 which seemingly conflicts with a
strict, literalist view of the doctrine. Given this ambiguity, Li Shuxian’s
significance is limited to its acknowledgment, rather than explanation, of the
idea/expression dichotomy.
While idea/expression case law from the 1990s is sparse, it appears that the
doctrine (predictably) remained hazy after Li Shuxian. This is evident from
Guangxi Broadcasting & TV Newspaper v. Guangxi Coal Workers Newspaper, 156
a 1995 decision that has cryptically been described as “similar to . . . the Feist
case . . . but with a contrary decision.” 157 Guangxi Broadcasting centered on the
copyrightability of charts displaying weekly television programming, which the
defendant had republished without seeking the plaintiff’s permission. 158 Both the
trial court and Liuzhou intermediate court agreed that the charts were not

150

Id. at 18–19.
Id. at 19; see also CHENG RONGBIN & JIANG XIAOCHUAN, supra note 144, at 46
(describing court’s reasoning in Li Shuxian v. Jia Yinghua).
152
See, e.g., ZHENG CHENGSI, supra note 75, at 19–20; CHENG RONGBIN & JIANG
XIAOCHUAN, supra note 144, at 46; Jiarui Liu & Fang Fang, supra note 73, at 507–08.
153
CHENG RONGBIN & JIANG XIAOCHUAN, supra note 144, at 46.
154
See Zhang Youyi, You guan mo dai huang di jiu fen kai zhu zuo quan shen pan xian he 20
nian chen ai luo ding [After 20 Years, The Dust Has Settled in the “Last Emperor” Dispute that
First Initiated Judicial Precedent in Copyright], LEGAL DAILY, July 1, 2007,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2007-07/01/content_6314108.htm (contrasting Li Shuxian v. Jia
Yinghua with Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), in
which the court “erroneously found copyright infringement on the basis of similarities in structure,
sequence, and organization”).
155
CHENG RONGBIN & JIANG XIAOCHUAN, supra note 144, at 46.
156
ZHENG CHENGSI, supra note 75, at 34.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 34–35.
151
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copyrightable, 159 but the Liuzhou court nonetheless awarded compensation and
issued an injunction on the rationale that allowing free republication of the charts
would not be “fair.” 160
Notwithstanding the television charts’ lack of
copyrightable expression, the court believed that equitable principles favored the
plaintiff.
The Liuzhou court may not have technically contravened the idea/expression
dichotomy, but it effectually undermined a major policy rationale for the doctrine:
protection of the public domain. Denying the charts’ copyrightability but
prohibiting their reproduction on “fairness” grounds effectually amounts to the
creation of an exclusive right in facts. Guangxi Broadcasting’s significance for
copyright law is further undermined by the fact that, when the Supreme People’s
Court (“SPC”) republished the Liuzhou court’s decision, it omitted the copyright
holding. 161 The “official” version of the opinion states that the charts did not fall
within the Article 5(2) “news reporting” exception (an argument the defendant
had advanced), but ultimately leaves the charts’ copyright status ambiguous. 162
The SPC-approved version also jettisons the “fairness” rationale, grounding the
outcome of the case instead in an earlier administrative notice that did not relate
to copyright. 163
As Li Shuxian and Guangxi Broadcasting demonstrate, Chinese courts
apparently recognized the idea/expression dichotomy in the 1990s, but did not
elaborate its precise meaning and may not have thoroughly appreciated the
purposes of the doctrine.

159

By comparing the case to Feist, Zheng Chengsi implies that the courts both denied
copyrightability for lack of originality; however, he does not elaborate on either court’s rationale.
See ZHENG CHENGSI, supra note 75, at 35–36. Peter Feng does not address the lower court’s
rationale, but states that the intermediate court “declined to view the chart as copyright [sic] for
lack of originality.” FENG, supra note 58, at 86. The version of the opinion that was eventually
published—as amended by the Supreme People’s Court’s Adjudication Committee—indicates that
the lower court held that the charts fell within the Article 5(2) “news reporting” exception.
Guangxi Broad. & TV Newspaper v. Guangxi Coal Workers Newspaper (as amended),
CHINALAWINFO, (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).
160
ZHENG CHENGSI, supra note 75, at 36.
161
Since 1985, the Supreme People’s Court has republished selected lower court decisions in
the Gazette of the Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China. However, the Court
frequently edits the selected cases prior to publication in the Gazette. Nanping Liu, “Legal
Precedents” with Chinese Characteristics: Published Cases in the Gazette of the Supreme
People’s Court, 5 J. CHINESE L. 107, 108, 116 (1991).
162
Guangxi Broadcasting (as amended).
163
Id.
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B. Contemporary Application of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy
In recent years, China has invested heavily in its court system, especially with
respect to the handling of intellectual property cases. Since the early 1990s, an
increasing number of courts have set up “IPR chambers” staffed by “younger and
better-trained judges whose careers are devoted to adjudicating [IP] cases.” 164 As
a consequence, judicial decision-making has greatly improved in these courts. 165
While the Chinese judiciary is considered weak by Western standards,166 the SPC
has become more assertive, issuing detailed interpretations of existing law in a
quasi-legislative manner. 167 The Court has also long republished “typical”
(dianxing) judicial opinions, which guide lower courts, clarify points of doctrine,
and serve a quasi-precedential function. 168 In November 2008, the SPC
promulgated 100 “typical” IP cases, which are expected to bring greater
coherence and predictability to Chinese IP law. 169 Additionally, new IP-related
judicial opinions are routinely posted to the SPC Intellectual Property Division’s
website. 170
If the courts’ modern understanding of the idea/expression dichotomy is any
indication, China’s investment in its legal and judicial system has borne fruit.
Despite the doctrine’s tortured history in China, modern courts have managed to
apply it in a reasonably coherent manner. While there are some residual problem

164

FENG, supra note 58, at 28. Earlier this year, for instance, the People’s Court in
the Changping District of Beijing established an IPR trial chamber. IPR in China, Beijing:
Changping Court Sets Up IPR Trial Chamber, May 25, 2009, available at
http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/news/local/261441.shtml.
165
Yu, supra note 136, at 946–47.
166
One scholar has wondered (rather cynically) whether, “despite [Chinese courts’]
superficial resemblance to the courts of Western nations, they can be regarded as functionally
comparable institutions.” Anthony R. Dicks, Compartmentalized Law and Judicial Restraint: An
Inductive View of Some Jurisdictional Barriers to Reform, 141CHINA Q. 82, 94–95 (1995); see
also CHOW, supra note 9 (describing Chinese judicial system).
167
Zhang Lihong, The Latest Developments in the Codification of Chinese Civil Law, 83 TUL.
L. REV. 999, 1006 (2009). Of course, the rulemaking nature of these interpretations raises serious
constitutional questions. See id. (describing SPC interpretations as a “deformed exercise of
legislative power—a power not granted to such a judicial body under China’s constitutional law”).
Nonetheless, even in the face of criticism from some lawmakers and scholars, the SPC continues
to issue judicial interpretations. Id.
168
FENG, supra note 58, at 34. Lower courts may not, however, cite directly to previous
cases. Id.
169
Yun Zhang, China IP: 100 Typical Cases Provide More Certainty for Right Holders,
ASIAN LEGAL BUSINESS, Dec. 16, 2008, available at http://asia.legalbusinessonline.com/contents/
31930/details.aspx.
170
Zhongguo zhi shi chan quan cai pan wen shu wang [China Intellectual Property Judgment
Net], http://ipr.chinacourt.org/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).
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areas, Chinese judges have gone a long way toward compensating for the
deficiencies in PRC statutory law.
1. Chinese Courts’ Basic Conception of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy
Chinese courts typically explain the idea/expression dichotomy in terms
similar to Zheng Chengsi’s American-styled thought/expression (sixiang/biaoda)
formulation. For instance, as one court recently stated, “copyright does not
protect the ‘thoughts’ [sixiang] that an author expresses in his work, but only the
author’s ‘expression’ [biaoda].” 171 Other terms are occasionally used in
conjunction with or, less frequently, in the place of sixiang, including guannian
(“concepts”), qinggan (“emotions”), and chuangyi (“creativity”). Similarly, some
courts have enumerated the various uncopyrightable elements in a manner similar
to the TRIPs Agreement or the U.S. Copyright Act. 172 In fact, in one instance, a
court has lifted its explication of the doctrine directly from Section 102(b) of the
U.S. statute, albeit without citation. 173 This variance in terminology is not so
much indicative of a lack of consensus as it is an appreciation of the breadth of
unprotectable elements encapsulated in the shorthand “idea.”
Wan Juan v. Changsha Flagship Real Estate Consulting is fairly
representative of Chinese courts’ application the idea/expression dichotomy. That
case concerned the copyrightability of a work on real estate investment that the
plaintiff had authored. 174 The court held that because the plaintiff had
“supplemented” uncopyrightable computation tables with her own textual
narration, she was entitled to copyright protection. 175 Although the defendants
had allegedly appropriated some of the plaintiff’s ideas, their copying did not
extend to the plaintiff’s original expression. Because “the scope of copyright
protection does not extend to . . . concepts as such, the plaintiff [could] not
prevent others from using the ideas expressed in her work.” 176 As in Baker v.
Selden, the plaintiff could only claim copyright in her original expression, but not
in the ideas themselves.

171

Tian Xiuhua v. Anhui Lin Shui Wine Co. (Anhui High People’s Ct., Dec. 23, 2008),
available at http://ipr.chinacourt.org/public/detail_sfws.php?id=30786.
172
See, e.g., Zhang Chengxuan v. Zhang Jixiang (Sichuan High People’s Ct., Mar. 28, 2008),
available at http://ipr.chinacourt.org/public/detail_sfws.php?id=24238 (“‘[C]oncepts’ [sixiang
guannian] refers to opinions, ideas, principles, objective facts, creativity, inventions and
discoveries, crafts and methods, etc.”).
173
Wan Juan v. Changsha Flagship Real Estate Consulting Ltd. (Changsha Interm. People’s
Ct., Dec. 7, 2005), available at http://ipr.chinacourt.org/public/detail_sfws.php?id=2977.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id.
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In addition to applying the idea/expression dichotomy as such, Chinese courts
have also recognized a number of related doctrines. For instance, the Wan Juan
court rebuffed the plaintiff’s claim that the defendants had copied her expression
of certain mathematical concepts by invoking the merger doctrine. 177 And in Liu
Kai v. Da’erhan Maoming’an United People’s Government, an intermediate court
recognized the concept of “thin” copyright, holding that a map, as a factual work
with limited expressive possibilities, could only be infringed by verbatim
copying. 178 Finally, in a SPC-approved “typical” case, the Chongqing High
People’s Court conducted an analysis resembling the abstraction–filtration–

177

See id.:
[B]ecause mathematical formulas may only be expressed in one
manner, they merge with the ideas that the work is intended to express
. . . . Objectively speaking, others are unable to find an alternate
expressive form that adequately reflects those ideas. Therefore, the
plaintiff cannot prohibit the defendant from copying [the expression of]
her mathematical formulas in order to make use of the real estate
investment method [that they express].
Cf. 4-13 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 102, at §13.03[B][3] (“In some circumstances . . .
there is a ‘merger’ of idea and expression, such that a given idea is inseparably tied to a particular
expression. In such instances, rigorously protecting the expression would confer a monopoly over
the idea itself, in contravention of the statutory command.”).
178
See Liu Kai v. Da’erhan Maoming’an United People’s Gov’t (Inner Mongolia Baotou
Interm. People’s Ct., July 31, 2007), available at http://ipr.chinacourt.org/public/detail_sfws.
php?id=21476:
[b]ecause maps are “scientific works” that normally “reflect objective
truths,” there is little “room for creativity” and the “manner of
expression is limited to one or only a few possible forms. Anyone who
draws a map [of the same region] cannot avoid identicality or similarity
. . . . [T]he map should not receive copyright protection, except in the
case of verbatim copying of the copyright holder’s original work.
Cf. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir. 1994) (“When the
range of protectable and unauthorized expression is narrow, the appropriate standard for illicit
copying is virtual identity.”).
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comparison test, 179 in which it “filtered” out facts and other unprotected elements
in assessing substantial similarity. 180
2. The Residual Appeal of Content/Form
Although Chinese courts shy away from the strict content/form
(neirong/xingshi) formulation, some courts have nonetheless tended to view
expression in overly literalist terms. For instance, in He Xiaoli v. Dao Lang, the
Shaanxi High People’s Court stated that the Copyright Law “primarily protects a
work’s expressive form [biaoda xingshi], but does not protect the thoughts and
emotions expressed by a work.” 181 That case concerned two songs that bore the
same name and allegedly had similar lyrics. The court rejected the plaintiff’s
argument that the songs should be analyzed for similarity as to “theme” or “plot,”
and instead simply determined how many words the defendant had borrowed. 182
Because the songs were textually distinct, the court held that no infringement had
occurred. 183 While theme is likely too abstract to merit protection, categorically
excluding plot as part of the author’s expression is difficult to reconcile with the
rights of translation and adaptation. 184
In Guangzhou Xian Yi Body Undergarment Co. v. Guangzhou Jin Ke Trade
Co., the Guangzhou Baiyun District People’s Court took a slightly more liberal,
but still restricted, approach to expression. 185 There, the plaintiff charged that the
179

See Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992):
In ascertaining substantial similarity . . . a court would first break down
the allegedly infringed program into its constituent structural parts.
Then, by examining each of these parts for such things as incorporated
ideas, expression that is necessarily incidental to those ideas, and
elements that are taken from the public domain, a court would then be
able to sift out all non-protectable material. Left with a kernel, or
possibly kernels, of creative expression after following this process of
elimination, the court’s last step would be to compare this material with
the structure of an allegedly infringing program.
180
See Gao Xiaohua v. Chongqing Chen Kezhi Culture & Arts Broad. Co. (Chongqing High
People’s Ct., June 29, 2006), available at http://ipr.chinacourt.org/public/detail_sfws.php?id=4951
(declining to find infringement on the basis of shared geographical and topographical features in
two paintings, stating that the plaintiff “may not transfer [elements] that belong in the public
domain into his work’s realm of exclusive protection”).
181
He Xiaoli v. Dao Lang (Shaanxi High People’s Ct., Aug. 31, 2005), available at
http://ipr.chinacourt.org/public/detail_sfws.php?id=1690.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
PRC Copyright Law arts. 10(14), (15); cf. Chen Jiaqiang, supra note 76, at 108 and
accompanying text.
185
Guangzhou Xian Yi Body Undergarment Co. v. Guangzhou Jin Ke Trade Co. (Guangzhou
Baiyun Dist. People’s Ct., July 26, 2007), available at http://ipr.chinacourt.org/public/
detail_sfws.php?id=17911.
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defendant had infringed its commercial advertisement. The court found
infringement on the ground that the defendant’s and plaintiff’s commercials were
substantially similar as to “main content, basic plot, narration, product
demonstrations, etc.” 186 Yet despite this apparent recognition of copyright in
nonliteral expression (in “basic plot,” for instance), the court went on to state that
the plaintiff’s “cinematographic techniques” did not constitute “expressive form,”
and therefore were not entitled to copyright protection. 187 This holding seems
strange in light of the obvious analogies that may be drawn between a
filmmaker’s use of a camera and an artist’s use of a brush (which another court
has recognized as a component of the artist’s expression 188 ).
As these cases demonstrate, there is some residual hesitancy among some
courts to extend copyright protection to works’ nonliteral expression. Courts do
not embrace the strict content/form version of the dichotomy, but even a more
liberal iteration of the theory (such as that applied in Guangzhou Xian Yi) risks
unduly circumscribing copyright.
3. “Sweat of the Brow” Considerations
Chinese courts have largely eschewed the “sweat of the brow” doctrine in
copyright disputes. In Wan Juan, for example, the plaintiff claimed copyright in
some of the concepts presented in her work on real estate investment, on the basis
that she herself had pioneered them. 189 The Changsha Intermediate People’s
Court responded by stating “the plaintiff cannot, on this basis, forbid others from
using the ideas expressed in her work.” 190 Similarly, in Beijing Jiu Qi Software
Limited Stock Co. v. Shanghai Tian Chen Computer Software Co., the Shanghai
Second Intermediate People’s Court held that although the plaintiffs had
“expended a certain degree of labor” in designing a user interface for their

186

Id. While “etcetera” would seem very out of place in a U.S. legal text, the Chinese
equivalent, deng, is quite common in Chinese law—to the consternation of Westerners. As
Deborah Cao writes, “[t]he habitual and sometimes over-frequent use of deng . . . allows for openended interpretations[, which] can cause a great deal of uncertainty and ambiguity.” DEBORAH
CAO, CHINESE LAW: A LANGUAGE PERSPECTIVE 102 (2004).
187
Id.
188
Gao Xiaohua v. Chongqing Chen Kezhi Culture & Arts Broad. Co. (Chongqing High
People’s Ct., June 29, 2006), available at http://ipr.chinacourt.org/public/detail_sfws.php?id=4951
(like the Baiyun court in Guangzhou Xian Yi, this court uses the term shoufa for “technique.”).
189
See Wan Juan v. Changsha Flagship Real Estate Consulting Ltd. (Changsha Interm.
People’s Ct., Dec. 7, 2005), available at http://ipr.chinacourt.org/public/detail_sfws.php?id=2977
(“In this case, the plaintiff emphasizes that she originated ‘actual down payment’ and other
concepts, and that the defendant, without authorization . . . used these concepts, and that this
constitutes copyright infringement.”).
190
Id.
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software; they were not entitled to a copyright in that feature because it did not
exhibit sufficient original expression.191
However, there is evidence that the equitable “fairness” principle invoked in
Guangxi Broadcasting still has some vitality. In Pan Ling v. Ma Liqing, the
defendant had copied some material from plaintiff’s unpublished doctoral
dissertation. 192 The Beijing Haidian District People’s Court held that the material
in question was not copyrightable, but nonetheless ordered the defendant to
compensate the plaintiff on the ground that free riding off of the plaintiff’s efforts
was not “fair.” 193 Although the Beijing Second Intermediate People’s Court
vacated the trial court’s decision, siding with the plaintiff on different grounds, 194
the lower court’s decision reveals that “sweat of the brow” considerations —
under the guise of equitable “fairness” — at least occasionally, hold sway in
Chinese courts. This effectually creates a proprietary interest in facts, ideas, and
other uncopyrighted subject matter, thereby undermining the public-oriented
policies that the idea/expression dichotomy serves.
4. Originality and Creativity
Like the U.S. Supreme Court in Feist v. Rural, Chinese courts have
recognized the necessary interplay between the idea/expression dichotomy and
the statutory requirement that copyrighted works exhibit “originality.” 195 As the
Anhui High People’s Court has asserted, “copyright law . . . only protects the
author’s ‘expression,’ . . . [which] means that the work possesses originality and
is reproducible in a certain tangible form.” 196 Consistent with Feist, Chinese
courts have distinguished originality from novelty, and have inferred that
originality requires some degree of creativity. 197 In Beijing Jiu Qi, for example,
the court held that the computer program’s user interface was not copyrightable
because its menus and buttons merely “indicated their respective functions,” and

191

Beijing Jiu Qi Software Ltd. Stock Co. v. Shanghai Tian Chen Computer Software Co.
(Shanghai 2d Interm. People’s Ct., Jan. 25, 2005), available at http://ipr.chinacourt.org/public/
detail_sfws.php?id=9254.
192
Pan Ling v. Ma Liqing (Beijing 1st Interm. People’s Ct., June 8, 2009), available at
http://hi.baidu.com/%B6%DB%B5%B6sd/blog/item/6b375d104b1407cfa6ef3f95.html.
193
Id.
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See id. (holding that the borrowed materials were in fact copyrighted, and that the
defendant had infringed them).
195
See Implementing Regulations art. 2 (copyrighted works must be original).
196
Tian Xiuhua v. Anhui Lin Shui Wine Co. (Anhui High People’s Ct., Dec. 23, 2008),
available at http://ipr.chinacourt.org/public/detail_sfws.php?id=30786 (emphasis added).
197
See id. (“The originality requirement under copyright law . . . does not require that the
thought expressed in or form employed by a work be novel, only that the work be independently
completed and reflect certain personalized features. . . .”).

[1:62 2010]

CYBARIS™, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW

94

its overall layout was “only a simple permutation.” 198 Like the plaintiff’s
directory in Feist, the user interface was so lacking in creativity that it “failed to
meet the originality requirement.” 199
There is a serious lack of consensus, however, as to the standard for creativity.
As one scholar observes, “theorists have constantly debated the originality
requirement’s definitional standard as adopted in Chinese law.” 200 One view that
has gained some traction draws from the German concept of Schöpfungshöhe,
which requires that authors exhibit a “level of creativity” that “rise[s] above
craftsmanship, above the average.” 201
This standard is somewhat more
demanding than the “modicum of creativity” rule set forth in Feist. 202 A handful
of Chinese courts have endorsed and applied this heightened standard. 203 In Ai Lu
Mu International Stock Co. v. Huizhou Xin Li Da Electronic Instrument Co., for
example, the Guangdong High People’s Court denied copyright in a work of
applied art because its artistic elements did not exhibit “artistic meaning or

198

Beijing Jiu Qi Software Ltd. Stock Co. v. Shanghai Tian Chen Computer Software Co.
(Shanghai 2d Interm. People’s Ct., Jan. 25, 2005), available at http://ipr.chinacourt.org/public/
detail_sfws.php?id=9254.
199
Id.
200
Ye Qing, Lun zuo pin de du chuang xing biao zhun [On the Originality Standard], 2007 FA
ZHI YU SHE HUI [LEGAL SYS. & SOC’Y], No. 2, at 694, 695.
201
Gerhard Schricker, Farewell to the “Level of Creativity” (Schöpfungshöhe) in German
Copyright Law?, 26 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 41, 41–42 (1995).
202
See Guy Pessach, The Legacy of Feist Revisited—A Critical Analysis of the Creativity
Requirement, 36 ISR. L. REV. 19, 22, 35 (2002) (advocating continental Europe’s “personal
intellectual creation” standard, which is codified in German copyright law, requires a “high level
of creativity”); see also Schricker, supra note 201, at 41–42 (stating the “level of creativity”
concept is “one of the terms employed . . . to clarify the cryptic formula of a ‘personal intellectual
creation,’ contained in Sec. 2(2) of the German Copyright Act”).
203
See, e.g., Wuhan Garden Sculpture Ctr. v. Tu Ya (Henan High People’s Ct., Aug. 29,
2007), available at http://ipr.chinacourt.org/public/detail_sfws.php?id=18099 (affirming trial
court, which considered the “level of creativity” that the plaintiff “invested” in his work in
reaching its conclusion); Guangzhou Xian Yi Body Undergarment Co. v. Guangzhou Jin Ke Trade
Co. (Guangzhou Baiyun Dist. People’s Ct., July 26, 2007), available at http://ipr.chinacourt.org/
public/detail_sfws.php?id=17911 (“[T]he work must reflect the author’s personalized or
individualized level of creativity”); Zhang Liusheng v. Anhui Prov. Susong County Post Off.
(Anhui High People’s Ct., June 8, 2004), available at http://ipr.chinacourt.org/public/
detail_sfws.php?id=2995 (“Not all photographs can become photographic works [protected under
the Copyright Law]; only those photographs that achieve a certain level of creativity and possess
originality merit copyright protection.”). Additionally, some of the early scholarship on the
Copyright Law endorsed the “level of creativity” standard. See, e.g., Xiao Jun, Lun wo guo zhu
zuo quan fa bao hu de zuo pin [On Works Protected by China’s Copyright Law], 1990 ZHONGGUO
FA XUE [CHINESE LEGAL STUD.], No. 6, at 60, 63.
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aesthetic value,” and therefore failed to achieve the “level of artistic creativity”
necessary to constitute a copyrightable artistic work. 204
The “level of creativity” standard is not universally applied, however; several
other iterations of the creativity requirement exist. Some cases have stated that
originality requires that a work display “certain personalized features.” 205 In
another court’s view, “originality refers to . . . distinctiveness [teyixing] or
difference [chayixing] that distinguishes [the work] from other works.” 206 In a
case designated as “typical” by the Supreme People’s Court, the Yunnan High
People’s Court stated that a copyrighted work must “be capable of independently
expressing comments, knowledge, ideas, thoughts, emotions, etc., such that a
large audience may understand a certain message.” 207 In that case, the court
determined that the title of the work in question was not itself copyrightable
because the author’s “thoughts, emotions, personality, and creative style” could
not be deduced from it. 208
While the imposition of a creativity requirement is necessary to preclude
overbroad copyright protection in works that are independently authored and
reproducible, but minimally expressive, the substance of that requirement is not
yet clear in Chinese law. The Supreme People’s Court recently expressed some
preference for the Yunnan court’s formulation, but the standard has yet to gain
widespread acceptance among Chinese judges and scholars.
In sum, modern Chinese courts generally recognize and apply the
idea/expression dichotomy in a defensible manner. The courts have imported
associated doctrines (such as merger), recognized the dichotomy’s relationship
with originality, and inferred a creativity requirement. However, the cases also
reveal a tendency to view “expression” in unduly literalist terms, occasional
appeals to sweat-of-the-brow considerations, and a high degree of indeterminacy
with respect to the creativity requirement.
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i Lu Mu Int’l Stock Co. v. Huizhou Xin Li Da Elec. Instrument Co. (Guangdong
High People’s Ct., Oct. 20, 2006), available at http://ipr.chinacourt.org/public/detail_sfws.php?
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V. CONCLUSION
In light of the West’s manifest anxiety over China’s copyright regime, 209 the
relative lack of scholarship on the idea/expression dichotomy under Chinese law
is surprising. In addition to the economic factors that justify Western concern for
Chinese copyright law generally, 210 there are social and political reasons to study
the idea/expression dichotomy specifically. As a vital speech protection, the
doctrine takes on special significance in China, a nation with a poor record on
speech issues. All copyright laws restrict speech to one degree or another 211 and
some academics have noted the censorial potential of China’s Copyright Law in
particular. 212 Without a recognition that ideas, facts, and similar elements are not
subject to copyright, the Chinese public would be even more inhibited in its
freedom to exchange information and ideas. 213
As the Copyright Law does not presently articulate the idea/expression
dichotomy, one might expect that Chinese courts would fail to appreciate this
fundamental distinction, overextending copyright and shrinking the public
domain. But as this Article shows, the courts widely acknowledge the doctrine
and apply it routinely — notwithstanding the lack of statutory authority for it.
The status and content of the doctrine have been subjects of considerable
209

For an excellent account of the West’s influence on Chinese intellectual property law
see generally, ANDREW C. MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA (2005). A recent example of Western anxiety over Chinese copyright law
is a WTO dispute initiated in 2007, in which the United States alleged that various provisions in
Chinese law conflicted with the country’s obligations under the TRIPs Agreement. In January
2009, a WTO panel released a report indicating that China’s laws did, in fact, conflict with the
agreement in some respects. W.T.O. Finds China Copyright Law Lacking, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27,
2009, at B11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/27/business/27trade.html.
210
The Motion Picture Association, for instance, estimates that inadequate copyright
enforcement in China costs Hollywood studios hundreds of millions of dollars annually. Clifford
Coonan, Studios Retool Anti-Piracy Tactics, VARIETY, Nov. 29, 2007, http://www.variety.com/
article/VR1117976756.html.
211
See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 19, at 1181 (asserting that the U.S. Copyright Act literally
“abridges the ‘freedom of speech’ and ‘of the press’ in that it punishes expressions by speech
and press when such expressions consist of the unauthorized use of material protected
by copyright”); Yochai Benkler, Free As the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints
on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 363 (1999) (stating copyright law
creates “expectation[s] about how government will behave” toward certain communications).
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See, e.g., GANEA & PATTLOCH, supra note 71, at 226 (showing content-based restrictions
in Copyright Law “understandable against the background of a government that still claims the
authority to decide what people may read, watch and hear”); ALFORD, supra note 46, at 79 (stating
provisions of the 1990 Copyright Law “echo[ed] historic efforts to use copyright as a means of
limiting the spread of heterodox ideas”).
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See Nimmer, supra note 19, at 1189 (arguing if copyright protected ideas, “[t]he market
place of ideas would be utterly bereft, and the democratic dialogue largely stifled”).
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confusion in China, but on the basis of the courts’ increasingly sophisticated case
opinions, it appears that the judiciary has managed to safeguard the public domain
by filling much of the gap left by the legislature. In this respect, the Chinese
idea/expression dichotomy promotes freedom of expression.
This is not to say, however, that the courts’ exposition of the doctrine is
entirely consistent with the purposes of copyright. For instance, the courts tend to
under appreciate copyright interests by taking an overly literalist approach to
“expression.” In addition to creating tension with the various derivative work
rights bestowed by the Copyright Law, this trend threatens to discourage speech
by undermining incentives to produce and publish new creative works, and may
also contribute to China’s notorious under protection of copyright. 214 A
heightened creativity standard, which erects an additional barrier to copyright
protection and arguably requires courts to judge aesthetic value, presents the same
dangers. And while non-copyright doctrines, such as equitable “fairness,” may to
some extent mitigate the threat of diminished incentives, they distort the theory
and purposes of copyright law by countenancing “sweat of the brow”
considerations and recognizing de facto proprietary interests in uncopyrightable
subject matter.
These complications highlight the need for further development in Chinese
copyright law. While the National People’s Congress or State Council would do
well to codify the idea/expression dichotomy in the Copyright Law or
Implementing Regulations, perhaps using a broad formulation similar to that
found in the WIPO Copyright Treaty and TRIPs Agreement, it will probably
continue to devolve upon the courts to flesh out the doctrine. The Supreme
People’s Court can effectively coordinate this effort through the issuance of
official interpretations of the Copyright Law and the designation of “typical”
cases that demonstrate application of the dichotomy in specific factual
circumstances. These quasi-legislative, quasi-jurisprudential mechanisms are
likely to promote uniformity among the courts while allowing for flexibility and
frequent fine-tuning. Hopefully the Chinese judiciary keeps in mind the publicoriented purposes of the idea/expression dichotomy as it continues to elucidate the
doctrine.
The relative success of Chinese courts in developing the idea/expression
dichotomy raises compelling questions about the Chinese judicial system
214

As one scholar concluded in 2006, China’s “enforcement of intellectual property laws may
well be described as unsatisfactory if not dismal or in crisis.” JIANQIANG NIE, THE ENFORCEMENT
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 217 (2006). Like underenforcement of copyright
law, unduly circumscribing the scope of copyrightable expression undermines the ability of
authors and artists to protect their legitimate interests.
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generally. Do Chinese courts, despite the many limitations on their authority, 215
perform a lawmaking role comparable to that seen in the courts of common-law
systems? While this Article’s findings suggest that this may be the case, a study
of judicial decision-making across a broader range of contexts will be necessary
to corroborate this phenomenon. To the extent that Chinese courts may be said to
“make law,” additional questions loom as to the judiciary’s evolving role under
the PRC Constitution and in Chinese society, as well as the factors that animate
Chinese judicial reasoning when the legal code is ambiguous. Each of these
avenues for future research promises to shed additional light on the capacity of
Chinese courts to “agree on three articles of law.”
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See CHOW, supra note 9, at 169, 195–96 and accompanying text; see also supporting text,
supra note 137.

